Unmasking Digital Fraudsters with
CPLR 3102(c)

The explosion of ecommerce platforms, cross-border logistics systems, and digital payment channels has given entrepreneurs unprecedented freedom to transact globally. That same digital infrastructure, however, has enabled a new class of anonymous fraudsters who exploit platform ecosystems, vanish behind temporary storefronts, and operate across borders faster than traditional investigative processes can react.

When a business victim discovers it has been defrauded, the first challenge is often not proving liability—it is simply identifying who the wrongdoer is. Unlike traditional fraud, where counterparties are known, digital commerce frequently involves pseudonymous actors, shell entities, VPNs, and drop-addresses. In this environment, the ability to pierce anonymity early, before data disappears, can be decisive.

In New York, a procedural mechanism—quietly sitting in the Civil Practice Law and Rules—has increasingly become the tool of choice to solve that problem: CPLR 3102(c) pre-action disclosure.

CPLR 3102(c)

CPLR § 3102(c) authorizes courts to order disclosure before a lawsuit is even filed, where such disclosure is “necessary to frame a complaint” or identify appropriate defendants. In essence, it lets a party gather information in advance to ensure a viable claim can be brought against the right individuals. Critically, the rule is not a fishing expedition. Petitioners must demonstrate:

  1. A viable cause of action exists or is reasonably believed to exist

  2. The information sought is material and necessary to pursue that action

  3. Disclosure is otherwise unavailable without court intervention

In modern practice, this tool has become vital in matters involving fraud, anonymous digital conduct, cyber-misrepresentation, identity deception, and transient ecommerce storefronts. Unlike formal criminal subpoena processes or protracted international mutual legal assistance channels, CPLR 3102(c) provides a direct civil channel to compel identifying data.

The Digital-Commerce Context

Ecommerce has amplified the stakes. Sellers can spin up a storefront in minutes, transact at global scale, and dissolve their presence instantly. Payment methods can be disposable, contact information can be false, and IP trails can be obscured. Meanwhile, platform operators often hold the only usable breadcrumbs: email registrations, payment tokens, login metadata, and support logs.

Platforms, for their part, commonly adopt strict privacy and disclosure policies. Most refuse to release identifying data absent legal compulsion—both to protect user rights and to avoid liability. That stance forces legitimate victims to obtain judicial authorization before information changes hands. CPLR 3102(c) fills that procedural gap.

Case in Point: Pre-Action Petition to Compel Shopify

A recent filing illustrates how the mechanism functions in practice. In May 2024, I filed a verified petition seeking pre-suit discovery from Shopify Inc. after a client discovered multiple instances of shipping-weight fraud tied to two ecommerce storefronts. The petition alleged that the merchants manipulated reported package weights to generate artificially low shipping pricing, leaving my client exposed to more than $250,000 in carrier charges when true shipping weights were discovered.

After internal investigation and notification to foreign and domestic authorities, I contacted Shopify seeking identifying data associated with the online store TeaCultureBK.com. Shopify responded that its privacy policy barred disclosure absent a court order so I moved under CPLR 3102(c), requesting judicial authorization to serve a subpoena requiring Shopify to release identifying information, payment traces, and account logs necessary to name defendants and bring civil claims. Coordinating with Shopify, we further uncovered various aliases linked to the storefront, including property located in Brooklyn Heights which was on the precipice of a sale to new owners when I filed a lis pendens effectively blocking the sale/transfer. The matter remains ongoing. 

Why CPLR 3102(c) is Especially Powerful

  • Speed. Victims can move immediately, before data dissipates.

  • Precision. The mechanism targets only identity-enabling records.

  • Neutral balancing. Courts—not private platforms—decide when disclosure is warranted.

  • Jurisdictional leverage. New York’s status as a financial and commercial hub gives courts strong reach in digital commerce disputes.

Given the volatility of digital evidence and the ease with which fraudsters can vanish, these elements make 3102(c) a uniquely potent tool.

Common Use Cases in the Modern Era

  • Anonymous marketplace fraud

  • Chargeback and logistics manipulation schemes

  • Account takeovers and digital theft

  • Cryptocurrency scams tied to exchange accounts

  • Online defamation and harassment by pseudonymous actors

  • Misappropriation of data or trade secrets via digital channels

In all of these cases, victims often know the harm but not the perpetrator. 3102(c) bridges that gap.

Why Platforms Require Judicial Orders

To many business victims, platform refusal to disclose information can seem obstructive. In truth, most platforms are not adversarial—they are policy-bound. Global ecommerce platforms serve millions of users across multiple jurisdictions. If they disclosed account data upon request without judicial oversight, they could:

• Violate privacy statutes
• Expose themselves to civil liability
• Enable abuse of disclosure requests

Thus, platforms rely on neutral court review. 3102(c) harmonizes those interests—protecting privacy while enabling lawful pursuit of wrongdoers.

Strategic Considerations fo

  • Prepare evidence showing a credible fraud, not speculation

  • Identify specific data sought and why it is necessary

  • Demonstrate that platform information is uniquely essential

  • Move promptly, as digital records may degrade or be purged

  • Expect platforms to comply once properly ordered

The mechanism is judicial, not adversarial. Courts generally grant relief where the request is targeted, supported, and tailored to identify the wrongdoer.

Conclusion

Digital commerce has redefined anonymity, speed, and risk. Fraudsters exploit those properties. Businesses operating in this ecosystem—not just retailers, but logistics platforms, fintech companies, SaaS providers, and marketplaces—must be prepared to move quickly and surgically to identify adversaries.

CPLR 3102(c) provides the legal scalpel. It converts “unknown fraud actor” into “named defendant,” bridging the gap between injury and remedy. And while each petition rests on its facts, the procedural lesson is consistent: when platform identity disclosure is the missing link, 3102(c) is the mechanism built for the modern fraud environment.

In the coming years, as courts continue to refine digital-era disclosure norms, one expectation is clear: pre-action discovery will only become more central to the fight against online commercial deception. New York’s rule offers a tested blueprint for balancing privacy, due process, and the urgent need to stop cross-border fraud in its tracks.